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She was putting those tiny little pots into a long sort of box . . . when she put them in, the 
bottom opened and they fell out. . . . And the top and the bottom was open . . . she picked up 
[the box] and looked through it at us and cackled with laughter . . . she thought it was 
incredibly funny (Mother of Fiona, 8 months, interview). (p. 194)
In this sequence, Fiona’s mother reports a situation in which her 8-month-old daughter 
seems to have appreciated the comic aspect of a situation and shared it with her parents. 
To account for such an observation, Reddy proposes that the main principle of children’s 
development is their experience of mutual engagement with others. As it has implica-
tions for psychology in general, Reddy formulates her propositions at a theoretical level. 
The book opens with a reminder of two enduring dualisms: self–other and mind–
body. First, Reddy states, many currents of psychology assume that a researcher, or any 
person, knows what is in her mind, but considers that knowing other people’s minds is a 
problem. Second, psychology has replaced Descartes’ mind–body dualism by a mind–
behaviour dualism, both methodologically (psychologists are trained to observe behav-
iour without interpreting its meaning) and theoretically: current psychological theories 
based on theory of mind imply that, early in their lives, children base their reading of 
others’ actions only on the other’s behaviour, until they accede to theories of mind at 
around age 4—and from there, they make hypotheses about the other’s mind, ignoring 
their action. How we move from a world apprehended through perceptions of behaviours 
to a world constructed through representations remains an issue. 
According to Reddy, it is impossible to account for development in infants and 
children without a solution to the self/other and the mind/behaviour gaps. She identi-
fies two existing theoretical positions in psychology. On the one hand, first-person 
psychology is based on the model of a lonely thinker making hypotheses in her mind 
about what exists out there. On the other hand, third-person psychology considers that 
one can know self and others only on the basis of observables. Reddy proposes an 
alternative, a second-person psychology, according to which “others are experienced 
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as others, in direct emotional engagement” (p. 26). Within the limits of this active, 
emotionally engaged perception, others’ minds are “transparent” to the person. Hence, 
watching someone smile is a third-person experience; watching one’s friend smile at 
us and feeling the warmth that comes with it is based in a second-person experience—
an experience of being “tuned” to the other. This perceptive-and-emotional reaction 
enables the other to feel recognized, or acknowledged, as a person expressing some-
thing (here, smiling at us). Such basic and emotional engagement provides the infant 
with information guiding her further actions and experiences; it is thus, for Reddy, the 
main process through which minds develop. 
Reddy’s answer to the two classical philosophical issues is a model based on two 
features. First, interpersonal relationships have primacy over monological perspec-
tives: that is, it is a dialogical model. Second, the emotional apprehension of human 
experience has primacy over the perceptual and representational. In so doing, Reddy 
contributes to the field of infant development and to dialogical approaches in social 
and cultural psychology. 
The theoretical proposition of examining human development from a second-person 
perspective requires a suitable methodology. Reddy proposes a methodological posture 
based, first, on a balance between engagement (being engaged in the relation to other) 
and disengagement (stepping out of the relational flow, allowing reflection), and, second, 
on a “feeling for the organism,” a clinical sense for situation and what matters in interac-
tions with infants. Given the assumption that significant second-person relationships 
occur only with a specific person and are in large part emotional, the children’s carers 
mainly produce Reddy’s data. 
Concretely, the book is based on a series of vignettes generated by Vasudevi Reddy’s 
own observations of her interactions with her two children, at times videotaped, and 
mainly reported in diaries afterwards, and by mothers reporting significant daily events 
to a dictaphone or interviewed by Reddy and her team. Consequently, the second-person 
psychology proposed here is not strictly a second-person methodology. Reddy reports, 
for example, that her 2 ½-month-old daughter reacted by curving her arms close to her 
face in response to her grandmother’s smile and gaze, and interprets it as a form of coy-
ness (p. 131). What interests her is the child–grandmother second-person relation, not 
her own relation to the child (although she interprets the fact of coyness on the basis of 
many comparable situations, some involving her). The technique enables the adult to 
describe the child’s actions, her own and her perception of the child’s expression and/or 
her own emotional reaction, and even her interpretation of the meaning of the situation. 
However, such a technique does not give access to the child’s perspective and is there-
fore always an asymmetric and uncritical technique. This should not be a problem from 
Reddy’s perspective, however, as she seems to consider that the child is exposed to the 
same personally and culturally constrained reactions as the parent. The strength of 
Reddy’s methodology is her use of many vignettes from a single case to elaborate a 
model that accounts for a wide diversity of situations, and even for observations pro-
duced by other researchers.
The book is constructed along a developmental perspective, following children’s 
development from birth (in chap. 4) to about 1 or 2 years (in chap. 10). It explores a large 
range of interpersonal phenomena, starting with simple ones, such as imitation (chap. 4), 
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early communication (chap. 5), and shared attention (chap. 6), and moves to more com-
plex ones, requiring awareness of oneself: for example, coyness, shyness (chap. 7), and 
awareness of the other’s intentions (chap. 8), as can be manifested in humour (chap. 9) 
and faking, lying, or misleading the other (chap. 10). Through each of these themes, 
Reddy brings her own observations and reads them in the terms of her theoretical propo-
sitions, which, in turn, get progressively deeper and broader. 
Reddy challenges some of the assumptions of current developmental accounts. Her 
observations bring her to thus question the view stemming from current theory of mind, 
according to which children should not be able to lie until they can think that the other 
can have a representation in mind that is different from what is the case (p. 216). For 
example, when 11-month-old Anna keeps looking her mother in the eyes while throwing 
from under her arm, behind her, as if unseen, the toast she does not want to eat (p. 225), 
this seems to display sufficient awareness of the adult’s intentions and expectations to be 
able to defy them. A first-person psychology cannot account for this, because the child is 
“too young” to have a complex representation of the other’s representation. From the 
perspective of Reddy’s second-person psychology, these observations simply reflect the 
child’s active engagement with the adult, her awareness of the adult’s intention of want-
ing her to eat the toast, and her response to it.
A book always has an intended audience, and its shape is partly defined by the objec-
tions it tries to anticipate. How Infants Know Minds responds to the focus on child devel-
opment as an evolving ability to construct complex representations of other minds with 
a seemingly simple story: children have direct access to the other’s intentions through 
their perceptions and emotions. The rhetorical orientation of the book, however, does not 
allow Vasudevi Reddy to make fully explicit two further important theoretical ideas that 
are present in her explanations: the importance of dialogical processes and general devel-
opmental principles. I want to emphasize these two ideas, so as to explore how Reddy’s 
proposition might also contribute to advances in other fields of psychology. 
First, although the “second-person” theory proposed by Reddy is contrasted to first-
person (introspection) and third-person (“objective” observation) approaches, the author 
only mentions triadic models. She has good reasons for refusing a ternary relationships 
model when it assumes gaps between self and other, or mind and action. Moreover, her 
binary interpretation offers a parsimonious account of early development (see table 6.1, 
p. 115), where the second-person dynamic becomes increasingly complex to include the 
child’s intentions about, and uses of, others, objects, and complex modes of externaliza-
tion. Although this account of early development is quite convincing, in my view, her 
propositions can easily nourish and find a new general frame in current dialogical or 
cultural approaches to psychology. 
Ternary models have a long history in psychology (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & 
Psaltis, 2007). Many are dynamic, and include the essential interdependent relation-
ships. Hence, the psychosocial triangle represents the fundamental mutual dependency 
of self–other–objects relationships, as they constitute the social field, and mutually 
constrain and enable each other (Marková, 2008; Moscovici, 1984/2003). Similarly, 
the semiotic person–sign–person triangle, as in Vygotsky (1934), expresses the neces-
sarily culturally mediated nature of intrapersonal dynamics. Such dynamic triadic 
models prevent any of the classical “gaps” Reddy identifies. They also account for 
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more generally defined dialogical dynamics (Linell, 2009; Marková, 2008), such as 
the manner in which human action and communication necessarily entail answers to 
others or anticipation of others, within webs of interpersonal or imaginary relationships. 
Finally, some theoretical accounts based on such models even attempt to show how 
interpersonal or social triangles become intrapsychological triangles (Zittoun et al., 
2007). Reddy’s epistemology is compatible with current dialogical accounts, and 
Reddy’s “second-person” psychology could be seen as a model for explaining the 
emergence of the child’s ability to engage in ternary relationships. 
Reddy’s implicit developmental model is that of progressive complexity of actions 
and interactions. Children adjust to their perception of the other’s action, according to 
their actual growing capacities, and to the adult’s perception of the capacities of the 
child. This entails an open, dynamic system, composed primarily of the child-and-
the-other. The adult’s actions towards the child become the enabling conditions for 
the child’s actions, and so we have “feed-forward loops” (Valsiner, 2008). Through 
moments of exploration and try-and-fail (which correspond to Vygotksy’s ZPD), pat-
terns of action are progressively defined and more differentiated: the infant tries out 
alternative routes and specific actions. They also become more complex: the child is 
first engaged in immediate contact with the adult, and then is interested in what medi-
ates that engagement (parts of the body, objects); he develops intentions that encom-
pass a series of actions; she starts to use semiotic means, including language, to 
designate people, actions, and events. Thus, the model implies a progressive hierar-
chization of actions. Dynamic openness, progressive differentiation, and hierarchiza-
tion are general developmental principles (Werner & Kaplan, 1963) and How Infants 
Know Minds gives us careful accounts of microgenetic moments of emergence of new 
action within interaction. Moreover, because the principles underlying these observa-
tions are more general, these early developmental observations can be located within 
a life-span perspective. Consequently, we should find similar core patterns of mutual 
engagement in interactions with older children and adults; although these should be 
more complex, differentiated, and generalized. 
One of the challenges faced by psychology today is to develop a more integrative 
understanding of psychological phenomena, so as to counter the fragmenting tendency 
of the field (Valsiner, 2007; Yurevich, 2007). Reddy’s work, which offers a rich dia-
logical account of early activity, offers a genetic grounding to current reflections on 
development in a complex social and cultural world. As I have only suggested here, 
How Infants Know Minds can be reconnected to the whole stream of literature that 
accepts dialogical assumptions and could offer a substantial contribution to that field: 
the emergence of “thirdness” within dynamic interactions can be examined and the 
primordial role of emotional engagement in human actions and understanding can 
be tracked. 
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